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COMMENTAIRE 
 
 
A CASE FOR A LONGER TERM OF COPYRIGHT 
IN CANADA - IMPLICATIONS OF 
ELDRED V. ASHCROFT 
 
 par Kamil Gérard AHMED* 
 
  
En 1993, une directive de l'Union européenne a obligé les États membres à 
prolonger dans leur droit interne la durée minimale du droit d'auteur de vingt ans, la 
portant ainsi à soixante-dix ans après le décès de l'auteur, et exclut cette prolongation 
ne sappliquant pas aux États non membres qui noffrent pas la même durée de 
protection. Cette directive a été le fer de lance de changements législatifs à l'échelle 
internationale. En 1998, le Congrès américain a adopté le Copyright Term Extension 
Act, qui prolonge de vingt ans la durée de la protection des droits d'auteur existants et 
futurs. En 2003, l'arrêt de la Cour suprême des États-Unis Eldred c. Ashcroft, a 
confirmé la légalité du Copyright Term Extension Act. La protection couvrant la vie de 
l'auteur et les soixante-dix années suivant son décès dans l'Union européenne et aux 
États-Unis a eu des répercussions au Canada, où le régime de protection dans la Loi 
sur le droit d'auteur couvre à ce jour la durée de vie de lauteur plus cinquante ans. Le 
présent exposé soutient la position que le Parlement canadien ne doit pas ignorer les 
développements à l'égard  du droit d'auteur dans l'Union européenne et aux États-Unis 
et qu'il devrait modifier la Loi sur le droit d'auteur du Canada afin de prolonger la 
durée du droit d'auteur à soixante-dix ans après le décès de celui-ci. Dans le cadre de 
ses délibérations, le Parlement devrait tenir compte de la protection des intérêts des 
Canadiens titulaires de droits d'auteur dont les œuvres sont commercialement utilisées à 
l'échelle internationale, des réductions de coûts résultant de l'harmonisation de la loi 
canadienne sur le droit d'auteur avec celles de ses partenaires commerciaux, du risque 
de ralentissement de l'innovation au Canada du fait que la durée de protection du droit 
d'auteur est supérieure dans d'autres États, ainsi que les facteurs socio-économiques et 
les avancées technologiques qui démontrent la nécessité de prolonger la durée de 
protection du droit d'auteur. 
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In 1993, a European Union (EU) directive instructed EU members to extend 
their baseline term of copyright by 20 years, to 70 years subsequent to an author's 
death, and to deny the longer term of copyright to non-EU nation-states that do not 
provide the same extended term. This directive has spearheaded legislative change 
throughout the world. The United States (US) Congress adopted the Copyright Term 
Extension Act in 1998, which extended the term of all existing and future copyrights by 
20 years. The US Supreme Court affirmed the legality of the Copyright Term Extension 
Act in Eldred v. Ashcroft in 2003. A life plus 70 year copyright term in the EU and US 
has marked repercussions for Canada, whose Copyright Act still prescribes a life plus 
50 year term. This paper argues that Parliament must not ignore copyright law 
developments in the EU and US, and should amend the Canadian Copyright Act to 
extend the term of copyright to a life plus 70 term. In its deliberations, Parliament must 
consider protecting the interests of Canadian copyright holders who commercially 
exploit their works internationally. The potential cost savings resulting from the 
harmonization of Canada's copyright laws to that of its trading partners, the likely 
chilling effect on innovation in Canada given the longer terms of copyright in other 
nation-states, in addition to demographics and technology are all compelling factors 
supporting a longer term of copyright.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A copyright is a proprietary right in a unique work of authorship 
potentially having significant pecuniary value. The party having title to a 
copyright is entitled to exclusively earn royalties during its term, which explains 
the economic significance of the term of copyright. This is particularly true in 
light of globalization. In 1993, a European Union (EU) directive instructed EU 
members to extend their baseline term of copyright by 20 years, to 70 years 
subsequent to an authors death, and to deny the longer term of copyright to non-
EU nation-states that do not provide the same extended term. This directive has 
spearheaded legislative change throughout the world. In January 2003, the United 
States (the US) Supreme Court affirmed the legality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act1  (CTEA) in Eldred v. Ashcroft2 (Eldred), where all existing 
and future US copyrights are extended by 20 years. The copyright term in the US 
thus extends to 70 years subsequent to an authors death and makes American 
and European law concordant. Without doubt, one fundamental purpose of 
copyright is to create incentives for authors to create works of authorship  this is 
a classic Lockean, fruit of ones labour story. One issue requiring analysis, 
however, is the incremental economic benefit ensuing from copyright term 
extension. Copyright law is indeed a fruitful area of law and economics 
literature3.  One of the amicus curiae briefs filed in Eldred was authored by the 
most prominent economists of our generation4.  Their analysis indicates that 
                                                 
1. 17 U.S.C.A.  302(a) modifying Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. 101-1332. 
2. 123 S.Ct. 769. 
3. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law (1989) 
18 J. Legal Stud. 325 at 325 [Landes & Posner]. 
4. These authors are : (1) George A. Akerlof, Goldman Professor of Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley. Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics Sciences, 2001; (2) Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Joan Kenney Professor of Economics (emeritus), Stanford University. Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 1972; (3) Timothy F. Bresnahan, Professor of 
Economics, Stanford University & Co-Director, Center for Research on Employment and 
Economic Growth, Stanford University; (4) James M. Buchanan, Advisory General Director, 
Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University. Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences, 1986; (5) Ronald H. Coase, Clifton R. Musser Professor of Economics 
(emeritus), University of Chicago Law School. Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 
1991; (6) Linda R. Cohen, Professor of Economics, University of California, Irvine & 
Professor of Social Science and Law, University of Southern California Law School; (7) 
Milton Friedman, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution. Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences, 1976; (8) Jerry R. Green, John Leverett Professor in the University and 
David A. Wells Professor of Political Economy, Harvard University; (9) Robert W. Hahn, 
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incremental benefits of extension are modest and outweighed by corollary costs. 
The US Congress nevertheless opted to extend the term of copyright. 
 
A life plus 70 copyright term potentially has marked repercussions for 
Canada, whose Copyright Act5  still prescribes a life plus 50 term. This paper will 
argue that Parliament must not ignore EU and US copyright law developments 
and should amend the Canadian Copyright Act by extending the term of 
copyright to 70 years after the authors death, for the benefit of Canadian 
copyright title holders. While the Expert Economists analysis indicates the lack 
of real benefit to a longer term of copyright, their analysis is premised on the 
assumption of a closed economy and requires adaptation to an open economy 
setting. They do not consider the financial benefits of a longer term of copyright, 
the advantage of being at equal competitive footing, ceteris paribus, to ones 
competitors, cost savings resulting from the harmonization of a nation-states 
term of copyright to that of its main trading partners, the potential chilling effect 
on innovation given longer terms of copyright in other nation-states, 
demographics and technology as compelling factors supporting a longer term of 
copyright. While it is ultimately a question of empirical evidence weighing the 
costs and benefits of extending Canadas term of copyright, a number of intuitive 
arguments exist in its support. Section 1 of this paper will analyze the economics 
                                                 
Director, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies; (10) Thomas W. Hazlett, 
Senior Fellow, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research; (11) C. Scott Hemphill, Kapnick 
Fellow in Economics, Stanford University; (12) Robert E. Litan, Vice President and Director 
of Economic Studies, Brookings Institution & Co-Director, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies; (13) Roger G. Noll, Morris M. Doyle Centennial Professor of Public 
Policy, Stanford University; (14) Richard Schmalensee, John C. Head III Dean, Sloan 
School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; (15) Steven Shavell, 
Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School & Director, John M. Olin Center for 
Law, Economics, and Business, Harvard Law School; (16) Hal R. Varian, Dean, School of 
Information Management and Systems, University of California, Berkeley & Class of 1944 
Professorship, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley; and (17) 
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University at [Expert Economists]. See Amicus Brief in 
Support of  George A. Akerlof et al. on Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit  (20 May 2002), online : <http:// 
eldred.cc/legal/supremecourt.html> at 1a-2a [Expert Economists Brief]. (data accessed : 2 
March 2005) The US Supreme Court accepted and referred to this brief extensively which is 
why we have decide to retain the interpretation of these eminent economists for purposes of 
this paper. 
5. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s.6 [Copyright Act]. 
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of copyright and refers to the brief filed by the Expert Economists. Analysis of 
international arguments will then be undertaken in section 2, followed by a 
discussion of important factors in favour of extending the term of copyright 
pursuant to Eldred in section 3. 
 
1. Economics of Copyright 
 
The primary raison dêtre of copyright is to provide incentives for society 
to innovate by creating works of authorship. Assuming the economic rationality 
of authors, they will make investments for work-creation purposes insofar as 
future economic benefits are greater than or equal to initial investment, adjusted 
for the time value of money. The Expert Economists aptly note that [t]he 
economic value of a change in copyright policy depends upon the extent to which 
it increases incentives for creation6.  The extension of the term of copyright 
should thus be analyzed in this context. The economic value of new and existing 
works is different and will now be analyzed. 
 
1.1 New Works 
 
American and European copyright title holders benefit from a term of 
copyright 20 years longer than their Canadian counterparts. As long as market 
demand exists for their copyrighted works, title holders can thus earn additional 
revenue from the term extension7. This additional compensation can be measured 
in terms of net present value (NPV). With appropriate discounting, incremental 
revenues from a longer term of copyright will be small because future cash flows 
are distant from present. The Expert Economists provide a cogent example of an 
author having title to a copyright for 30 years during his/her lifetime  the pre 
and post-extension rights therefore respectively total 80 and 100 years. They 
demonstrated how extending the term of copyright by 20 years amounts to near 
negligible compensation using different reasonable discount rates, ranging from a 
0.04% to 1.28% incremental NPV which amounts to additional compensation of 
$0.00 and $0.25 respectively8.  This increment, however, is likely less since 
                                                 
6. Expert Economists Brief, supra note 4 at 5. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid. at 3a. Please note, as the Expert Economists mention, that [c]alculations assume a 
constant annual revenue stream. For ease of exposition, annual payments are assumed to be 
$1, but the percentage increases are unchanged for larger or smaller constant annual streams. 
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copyrights generally have diminishing returns. With full awareness of these data, 
the Expert Economists do not believe it can be seriously argued that an extended 
term of copyright provides additional incentive to innovate. However, most 
people arguably do not solely make their decisions based on NPV and the fact 
that a longer term of copyright has a small NPV may indeed ring on deaf ears. 
 
1.2 Existing Works 
 
Any incremental benefit for authors of existing works, no matter how 
modest, constitutes a windfall. It does not provide additional incentive to create 
new works of authorship, because, to state the most obvious, these works have 
already been created. The Expert Economists argue that the copyright term 
extension of existing works may create expectations of future extensions, but 
again, incremental revenues resulting from an extension are extremely modest. A 
perpetual copyright, for example, at a 7% interest rate would at most provide 
additional compensation of 0.12%, and likely far less when accounting for 
declining revenues9.  On the same token, it is highly unlikely that the windfall 
generates greater wealth for innovation or for re-investment into existing works 
in any statistically significant manner.  
 
1.3 Costs Resulting from Copyright Term Extension 
 
Incremental benefits from a longer term of copyright are modest. Costs 
should therefore be of similar magnitude to justify the policy measure. The 
Expert Economists opine that costs outweigh the benefits based on the social 
costs of monopoly and reduced innovation. 
 
1.3.1 Social Costs of Monopoly 
 
The social costs of monopoly to the economy are well known. 
Competitive pricing creates price competition, ultimately leading to marginal 
price equating to marginal cost. A copyright generally confers a monopoly to its 
title holder until it reverts to the public domain. Products are sold above marginal 
cost during the term of copyright and consumers are thus priced out of the market 
                                                 
9. Ibid. at 8. For further discussion, see Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual 
Property, Antitrust and the New Economy (2001) 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 453 at 471. 
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leading to deadweight loss to the economy. Extending the term of copyright by 
an additional 20 years further aggravates this deadweight loss with apparently 
minimal incremental NPV to copyright title holders. Most of monopolys social 
costs arise from existing works  just as incremental compensation for new 
works is small, so too is the present value (PV) of deadweight loss to the 
economy. This PV is highest for works closest to copyright expiration whose 
terms are then extended. [A] deadweight loss experienced today is 224 times as 
large in present value  as a deadweight loss eighty years from now (at a 7% 
interest rate)10. This cost is not counterbalanced by benefits ensuing from further 
innovation, which can make it significant11.   
 
1.3.2 Reduced Innovation 
 
A longer term of copyright reduces innovation by making it more 
difficult to create derivative works of authorship from copyrighted works12 and 
creates inefficiency in two ways. First, costs to prospective authors to create 
derivative works will increase because royalties must be paid to copyright title 
holders. Second, a number of transaction costs exist. Authors will incur expenses 
in locating and negotiating with copyright title holders. Identifying copyright title 
holders can be difficult  certain works of authorship by their very nature have 
many. Negotiating with multiple copyright title holders makes it more costly and 
difficult to achieve consensus. This is known as the tragedy of the 
anti-commons and leads to the underproduction of an artistic work13.  Extending 
the term of copyright by 20 years, according to the Expert Economists, is not 
economically justifiable because of costs created to society. The US Congress 
and EU nevertheless made the policy decision to extend the term of copyright 
and so too should the Canadian Parliament. 
                                                 
10. Ibid. at 11. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Common examples are altering famous paintings for comical or advertising purposes, or 
re-mixing songs. 
13. Ibid. at 13. See James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies : Commons and 
Anti-Commons (2000) 43 J.L. & Econ. 1. 
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2. International Arguments 
 
Copyright law is undoubtedly affected by globalization. The EUs 
adoption of a life plus 70 copyright term explains US Congress rationale in 
doing the same : 
  
A key factor in the CTEAs passage was a 1993 European Union (EU) 
directive instructing EU members to establish a baseline copyright 
term of life plus 70 years and to deny this longer term to the works of 
any non-EU country whose laws did not secure the same extended 
term. By extending the baseline United States copyright term, 
Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the 
same copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts.14 
 
Many countries are now debating whether to extend their terms of copyright15.  
Canada, of course, should not jump on this proverbial bandwagon without just 
cause, but this paper will demonstrate the probative force of a number of reasons 
favouring the extension of the term of copyright in Canada by 20 years. 
                                                 
14. Eldred, supra note 2 at 772. 
15. A comparison of copyright terms in selected countries for literary, dramatical, musical and 
artistic works indicates that it varies from none to life to life plus 100 years. The different 
terms of copyright are as follows : (1) life plus 100 : Mexico, (2) life plus 99 : Ivory Coast, 
(3) life plus 80 : Columbia and Guinea, (4) life plus 75 : Guatemala and Honduras, (5) life 
plus 70 : Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Costa Rica,  Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Irish Republic, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands, New Caledonia, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States, (5) life 
plus 60 : India and Venezuela, (6) life plus 50 : Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, 
Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, El Salvador, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, Thailand and United Arab Emirates, (7) life plus 30 : Iran, (8) life plus 25 (total 
protection to be not more than 50 years) : Iraq, and (9) none (or minimal) Afghanistan, 
Central African Republic and Kuwait. Allen Consulting Group, Copyright Term Extension 
 The Australian Benefits and Costs (July 2003), online : 
<www.allenconsult.com.au/resources/MPA_Draft_final.pdf> (date accessed : 27 February 
2005) at 4 [ACG]. 
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Justice Breyers dissenting judgment in Eldred rejects the argument that 
EU law is a threat to American competitiveness. He rather believes that both 
copyright law regimes have long co-existed despite regulatory differences and 
that the EUs developments are internal and unrelated to US copyright law16.  
This argument is more readily acceptable relative to the relationship between 
Canada and its southern neighbour. Geography itself accounts for this, coupled 
with the fact that the US and Canada have historically been one anothers largest 
trading partners. Applying Breyer J.s reasoning to Canada, Canadian and US 
copyright law must be unrelated since the location at which investment goes into 
the creation of a work has little to do with where it is exploited  this extended 
reasoning cannot be correct. Presumably, works are exploited across nation-state 
boundaries, especially with the Internet increasingly serving as a popular 
distribution channel. Furthermore, copyright law has a number of international 
facets, notably further to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works17  (the Berne Convention). This is where true inequality arises to 
the detriment of Canadian copyright title holders  nation-states that prescribe a 
life plus 70 term of copyright are only required to protect Canadian copyrights 
for a life plus 50 term pursuant to the Berne Convention. 
 
2.1 Financial Benefits Resulting from Copyright Term Extension 
 
The Berne Convention is founded on three basic principles : (1) national 
treatment, (2) automatic protection, and (3) independence of protection. The first 
and third principles are particularly important for this papers purposes. The 
principle of national treatment establishes that a nation-state where works 
originate from or from which authors are nationals (also known as a contracting 
state), must provide the same copyright protection to foreign authors as the 
contracting state provides to its own nationals. 
 
The principle of national treatment is subject to the principle of 
independent protection. The latter principle establishes the independence of 
protection in nation-states from where works of authorship originate. Where a 
contracting state provides for a term of copyright longer than the minimum 
                                                 
16. Eldred, supra note 2 at 810. 
17. Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
99-27 (1986). 
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standard prescribed by the Berne Convention and the work has ceased to be 
protected in the originating nation-state, protection may be denied by other 
nation-states. Under the Berne Conventions independence of protection 
principle, Canada is therefore required to protect the rights of certain foreign 
copyright title holders even where Canadian copyright title holders may no longer 
receive protection in these foreign nation-states. This situation appears intuitively 
unfair for Canadian copyright title holders.  
 
A longer term of copyright also places Canadian copyright title holders at 
a disadvantage relative to their competitors that originate from nation-states with 
longer terms of copyright on the basis that these competitors can earn revenue 
from their works of authorship for longer time periods. Whereas evidence from 
the Expert Economists again indicates that the incremental NPV from an 
extended term of copyright is small  between 0.04% and 1.28%  Canadian 
authors should not be ab initio disadvantaged relative to their competitors. 
Further to Breyer J.s argument, Canadian and US copyright law might not 
directly compete. Nevertheless, copyright title holders in Canada and the U.S. 
undoubtedly compete with one another and the life plus 50 copyright term in 
Canada economically disadvantages Canadian authors relative to foreign 
competition in life plus 70 regimes. The US Congress passed the CTEA to 
redress this very injustice. Parliament, which exists to further the interests of all 
Canadians, must remedy the ab initio disadvantage faced by Canadian copyright 
title holders by extending the term of copyright in Canada by an additional 20 
years. 
 
Annual royalties due to the CTEA's term extension are estimated at an 
aggregated $53 million in 2002 to $317 million in 201718.  Based on data 
contained in the AOL-Time Warner Brief filed in Eldred, this papers calculations 
indicate that the NPV of a 20 year copyright term extension in the US 
approximately ranges between $1.67 billion using a 5% discount rate, $1.44 
                                                 
18. Kelly Slavitt, The Copyright Term Extension Act : We May Know the Words, But Can We 
Find the Harmony? (2002) 11 MSU-DCL J. Int'l L. 457 at 459.  See  Amicus Brief in 
Support of Respondent on Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit of AOL Time Warner Inc., Warner Music, Warner Bros., and DC Comics 
(5 August 2002), online : <http:// eldred.cc/legal/supremecourt.html> (data accessed : 2 
March 2005) at 16-17 [AOL-Time Waner Brief]. 
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billion using a 7% discount rate, and $1.17 billion using a 10% discount rate19.  
The economic impact of an extended term of copyright will also be significant in 
Canada  this paper projects an NPV of $176 million using a discount rate of 5%, 
$151 million using a discount rate of 7%, and $123 million using a discount rate 
of 10%20.  The incremental NPV of extending the term of copyright in Canada 
may be small per average Canadian copyright title holder, but is significant in the 
aggregate for the Canadian economy. The Expert Economists note that monopoly 
costs and reduced innovation are high when extending a term of copyright. 
However, monopoly costs will only be incurred in Canada insofar as the marginal 
price is greater than marginal cost in Canada. An extended copyright term in 
Canada will in fact provide authors with greater earning potential internationally. 
Canadian copyright title holders license their works of authorship throughout the 
world, a not insignificant ratio of which may be in the EU and US for obvious 
economic reasons. Monopoly rents earned internationally will not lead to 
deadweight loss to the Canadian economy which consequently offsets costs 
associated with extending the term of copyright. While such monopoly prices 
may make the world as a whole less efficient, they clearly benefit Canadian 
copyright title holders and the Canadian economy more generally. The same 
rationale equally applies to reduced innovation  derivative works may decrease 
in Canada, but only to the extent that Canadian authors are deterred by paying 
royalties for an additional 20 years. An arguably greater share of reduced 
                                                 
19. The following notes and underlying assumptions apply to these calculations : (1) all figures 
are in 2002 US dollars, (2) additional revenue from royalties is $53 million in 2002, and 
$317 million in 2017, and (3) a straight line annual increase in royalty revenue of $16.5 
million is assumed [($317 million  $53 million)/(2017-2002)]. 
20. The following notes and underlying assumptions apply to these calculations : (1) all figures 
are in 2002 US dollars, (2) the population in the US and Canada in 2001 was 285,024,000 
and 30,007,094 respectively. I was unable to find estimates of aggregate copyright revenue 
in Canada between 2002 and 2017. Accordingly, to determine a conversion ratio between 
US revenues and what can be predicted in Canada, I used population of the two countries as 
a proxy for the differences in copyright revenues between both countries. The US/Canada 
conversion ratio is 9.50. This proxy is imperfect in the strict sense, but nevertheless provides 
a  relatively good approximation of incremental revenues for authors from extending 
copyright term in Canada. (3) a straight line annual increase in royalty revenue of $1, 
736.842 is assumed ($16.5M increase in the US divided by 9.50). For sources on US and 
Canadian population figures, see : United States Census Bureau, Population Figures, 
online : <http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/pop.pdf> (date accessed : 2 March 
2005), and Statistics Canada, Population Figures, online  : 
<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/popdwell/Table-PR.cfm> 
(date accessed : 2 March 2005). 
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innovation from a longer term of copyright in Canada will be felt in the US, 
Europe and beyond.  
 
2.2 Cost Savings Resulting from Harmonization 
 
When countries are segmented based on their terms of copyright, most of 
them figure either in the life plus 50 or life plus 70 categories. 2003 data from 
International Trade Canada indicate that between these two terms of copyright, 
95% of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada is from life plus 70 
nation-states, the lions share coming from the US and Europe, whereas only 5% 
of reported FDI originates from life plus 50 nation-states21.  By harmonizing 
Canadas law to those of its main trading partners, certain costs will diminish, 
such as those  associated with management of intellectual property rights as 
portfolios would expire at the same time across our major markets22.  These cost 
savings will help counteract costs related to inefficiency and reduced innovation 
 to which extent, however, is indeterminate.  
 
2.3 Potential Chilling Effect 
 
It could be argued that authors are now reluctant, or at the least, less 
willing to innovate in Canada because of a shorter time period from which 
monopoly rents can be earned relative to the US and EU. This said, the Expert 
Economists indicate that the incremental NPV per copyright title holder from 
extending the term of copyright is negligible and cannot rationally constitute 
incentive to further innovate. But the Expert Economists study is premised on the 
assumption that people are economically rational and this is often incorrect. 
Behavioural economics, which is inherently multi-disciplinary, attributes 
importance to peoples perceptions, rational or not. For prospective authors 
contemplating innovation, a shorter term of copyright may possibly dissuade 
them from innovation. In fact, [p]eople invariably look optimistically at their 
chances of winning, and extension [of the term of copyright] may add to this 
impression and stimulate additional creative activity23. The economic 
                                                 
21. International Trade Canada, Trade and Economic Analysis (7 October 2004), online : 
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eet/cimt/2003/CIIP03-en.asp> (date accessed : 3 March 
2005). 
22. ACG, supra note 15 at vii. 
23. Ibid. at 29. 
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irrationality of such behaviour is not crucial  it happens and Parliament must 
adapt to this reality. In this light, the status quo copyright term entails perception 
costs which are culturally disadvantageous to Canada24.   
 
3. Eldred Case 
 
Eldred notes two compelling points, inter alia, that justify a life plus 70 
copyright term :  (1) demographics, and (2) technology25. 
 
3.1 Demographics 
 
Demographics are important for two main reasons. First, human 
longevity has significantly increased in North America in the past generation. 
Second, people bear children at older ages than in the past, which is in part 
corollary of the former26.  Given this reality, the majority judgment in Eldred 
argues that it is a natural occurrence for parents to better safeguard the future and 
prosperity of their children by bequeathing them larger estates. An extended term 
of copyright facilitates this process by providing the opportunity for such revenue 
generation. Behavioural economics clearly plays a role in ascendants wanting to 
affect the behaviour and prosperity of their descendants  this is intuitive and 
empirically confirmed27.   
 
The US term of copyright was last extended in 197628.   Life expectancy 
in the US and Canada has since increased and will indeed continue to do so. 
From 1976 to 2001, for example, life expectancy in Canada increased by 6.3 
years for men and 5 years for women, and is projected based on moderate 
estimates by Statistics Canada to further increase by 4.7 and 2.1 years 
                                                 
24. Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote 
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts (2002) 36 L.A. L. Rev. 323 at 330. 
25. Eldred, supra note 2 at 772. The economic factors other than those related to globalization 
will be discussed. Nonetheless, it is difficult to differentiate the two as they are intimately 
related. 
26. Ibid. at 782n. 
27. B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Strategy Bequest 
Motive (1985) 93(6)J. Poli. Econ. 1045. See also B. Douglas Bernheim, How Strong Are 
Bequest Motives? Evidence Based Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance and 
Annuities (1991) 99(5) J. Poli. Econ. 899. 
28. Eldred, supra note 2 at 775-76. 
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respectively by 202629.  Although this does not entirely account for a 20 year 
copyright term extension in the US, it clearly lies within a range of 
reasonableness which is also applicable to Canada  a copyright term of life plus 
50 today represents a lesser window of opportunity in real terms than it did years 
ago. This papers calculations again indicate that Canada can expect an 
incremental NPV between approximately $176 million and $123 million using 
discount rates of 5% and 10% respectively30.  This revenue potentially explains 
why authors desire a longer term of copyright; because of the perceived benefit, 
whether real or not, to themselves and their estates. 
 
3.2 Technology 
 
Justice Ginsburg notes that the failure of the U.S. copyright term to keep 
pace with the substantially increased commercial life of copyrighted works 
resulting from the rapid growth in communications media31 justifies a life plus 
70 term of copyright. Technological advancement has occurred since time 
immemorial, but few would disagree that the current age has seen unprecedented 
acceleration in technological evolution and this trend is expected to continue for 
some time. Landes and Posner argue that a long trend exists towards the 
extension of copyright term. This trend is consistent with the fact that the cost of 
copying has fallen over this period32.  The Internet is the example par excellence 
of these developments. Online distribution and digitization have lead to 
substantial cost savings for many industries and arguably support an extended 
term of copyright in Canada to sustain this downward trend33.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Parliament must amend the Copyright Act to extend the current life plus 
50 term of copyright by an additional 20 years. The Expert Economists note that 
extending a nation-states term of copyright creates inefficiency in its economy 
and reduces innovation. This analysis makes perfect sense in a closed economy, 
but requires adaptation to an international and Canadian-specific context, and 
                                                 
29. Statistics Canada. Demography Division. 
30. See supra note 20. 
31. Eldred, supra note 2 at 782n. 
32. Landes & Posner, supra note 3 at 363. 
33. ACG, supra note 15 at vii. 
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does not consider a number of factors that have been addressed in this paper. 
Some 95% of Canadas reported FDI in 2003 originated from life plus 70 
nation-states. Parliament must not ignore these data. Indeed, in an era of 
multinational publishers and instantaneous electronic transmission  [,] 
harmonization  has obvious practical benefits and is a necessary and proper 
measure to meet contemporary circumstances 34  for Canadas prosperity. 
 
US copyright title holders can earn monopoly rents for an additional 20 
years in the EU, for example, and the opposite is also true. Canadian copyright 
title holders cannot do the same further to the Berne Convention and are thus ab 
initio precluded from earning additional revenue in life plus 70 nation-states  
this is unfair, unnecessary and disadvantages Canadian copyright title holders. 
Moreover, the incremental NPV of extending the term of copyright in Canada per 
average investor may be small, but as an industry, Canadian copyright title 
holders stand to gain a NPV of some $150 million assuming a 7% discount rate. 
This sum is certainly not insignificant. Furthermore, copyright title holders often 
perceive a longer term of copyright to be more valuable and this belief cannot be 
ignored. An aging population with a longer life expectancy, complemented by 
technologically driven times further support extending the term of copyright in 
Canada. 
 
The Canadian business community that has a vested interest in copyright 
term duration would prefer a life plus 70 term and Parliament must indeed remain 
responsive to these needs for a basket of reasons. The copyright-related industry 
in Canada is indeed very important to the countrys gross domestic product 
(GDP). According to Industry Canada, [i]n 2000, the ... GDP ... of the 
copyright-related sectors publishing, film, music, software, visual arts, etc.) was 
estimated at $65.9 billion or 7.4 percent of Canadian GDP. Between 1992 and 
2000, the value of these sectors increased by an annual average of 6.6 percent, 
compared with 3.3 percent for the rest of the Canadian economy. Together, these 
sectors formed the third most important contributor to the growth of Canadas 
economy.35 Despite the importance of the copyright-related industry to Canadas 
GDP, amending the Copyright Act to extend the current term of copyright has 
                                                 
34. Eldred, supra note 2 at 777. 
35. Industry Canada, Supporting Culture and Innovation : Report on the Provisions and 
Operation of the Copyright Act (October 2002), online : 
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/rp/section92eng.pdf> (date accessed : 25 September 2005). 
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been a politically oft-ignored matter, and this paper remains doubtful of 
Parliaments resolve to change the status quo. 
